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1Eastern Minds in Western Cockpits: A Cross-cultural Comparison of Aviation
Mishaps by Applying Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)
ABSTRACT
Introduction: Aviation accident rates are varied in different regions;
Asia and Africa have higher rates than Europe and America. There has
been a great deal of discussion about the role of culture in aviation
mishaps, however, culture is hardly ever mentioned as a causal factor
of accidents. It is hypothesized that different cultures will show
different patterns in the underlying causal factors in aircraft
accidents. Method: This research examined statistical differences in
the 18 categories of HFACS across accidents in the Republic of China
(Taiwan, a feminine, collectivist, strong uncertainty avoidance, and
high power-distance culture); India (a masculine, collectivist, weak
uncertainty avoidance, and high power-distance culture); and the USA
(a small power distance, weak uncertainty avoidance, individualist, and
masculine culture). Results: Ten HFACS categories exhibited significant
differences (p<0.05) between these three regions. These were related
to organizational processes; organizational climate; resource
management; inadequate supervision; personal readiness; physical/mental
limitations; adverse physiological states; adverse mental states;
skilled-based errors; and decision errors. The pattern of results was
congruent with what would be expected from Hofstede’s descriptions of
national culture. Conclusion: Culture may be a soft issue in aviation
operations, but it certainly can have hard consequences. Overall, the
evidence from this research supports the observation that national
cultures have an impact on aviation safety but adds further explanatory
power with regards to why this should be so.
Keywords: Accident Investigation, Cross-culture, Human Errors, Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS)
2INTRODUCTION
In accident investigations, it is often easier to identify hardware
failures as a cause than human errors. It is also generally acknowledged
that the aviation accident rates differ across regions. Asia and Africa
have higher accident rates than either Europe or America. These regional
variations suggest that there were fundamental, underlying factors
causing these differences in accident rates. Furthermore, it can be
suggested that the majority of the facets of the aviation system has
been constructed from a Western (North American/Western European)
perspective. As a result, the causal factors underlying accidents and
prevention strategies that seem reasonable to Westerners might present
problems for East Asian and African people. What is more, Western people
might not even be aware of such a problem (9, 11).
There has been a great deal of debate about the role of culture in
aviation mishaps, however, culture is rarely cited as a causal factor
underlying accidents. Nevertheless, culture is at the root of action;
it underlies the manner by which people communicate and develop attitudes
towards life. There are many definitions of culture. Kluckhohm (12)
proposed one well-known definition for culture; ‘culture consists in
patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and
transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements
of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential
core of culture consist of traditional ideas and especially their
attached values’. If the majority of people in a society have the same
way of doing things, it becomes a constituent component of that culture
(9). As a result it is essential to consider the cultural determinants
of behavior (19). A culture is formed by its environment and evolves
3in response to changes in that environment, therefore, culture and
context are really inseparable (14).
Johnston (10) suggested that regional differences have a major impact
on CRM implementation and crew performance. There is a marked difference
in how CRM training is perceived outside the USA. In the USA, CRM is
normally seen as the primary vehicle through which to address human
factors issues. Other countries, notably those in Europe, see human
factors and CRM as overlapping, viewing them as close but distinct
relatives. Orasanu and Connolly (15) have suggested that a great deal
of decision-making occurs within an organizational context, and that
the organization influences decisions directly (e.g. by stipulating
standard operating procedures) and indirectly through the organization’s
norms and culture. Culture fashions a complex framework of national,
organizational and professional attitudes and values within which groups
and individuals function. Cultures can be divided into different levels:
families, organizations, professions, regions, and countries. The power
of culture often goes unrecognized since it represents 'the way we do
things here'. It is the natural and unquestioned mode of viewing the
world (4). The same authors also strongly suggested that national
cultural characteristics play a significant part in aviation safety.
To a certain degree, aviation human factors have been dominated by
research into psychological and psycho-physiological attributes such
as motor skills, visual perception, spatial abilities, communication
and decision-making (3). This may crudely be classified as the ‘hardware’
of the human factors. However, for operating hardware, codes and
instructions are required that may be referred to as the ‘software of
the mind’. This software of the mind may be considered to be an indication
4of culture because culture provides 'a tool kit' of habits, skills, and
styles from which people construct 'strategies of action' (7).
Hofstede (5, 6, 7) proposed four dimensions of national culture:
 Power distance (PDI) focuses on the degree of equality, or
inequality, between people in the country's society. In
countries with a large power distance, subordinates are
subordinate to their superiors. A relatively small power
distance between superior and subordinate results in informal
relationships and a great deal of information and discussion.
If necessary, the subordinate will contradict his superior.
 Uncertainty avoidance (UAI) is the extent to which the members
of a society perceive a threat in uncertain or unfamiliar
situations, and the extent to which they subsequently try to
avoid these situations by means of regulations and bureaucratic
sanctions, amongst others actions. Uncertainty avoidance
concerns the situations of unclearness events, preferred more
predictable and which risks are more clearly defined events.
 Individualism (IDV) focuses on the degree that society
reinforces individual or collective achievement and
interpersonal relationships. In a highly individualistic
society rights are paramount. Individuals in these societies
may tend to form a larger number of moderately distant
relationships. A society with low individualism is typical
of a society of a collectivist nature with close ties between
individuals.
 Masculinity (MAS) exemplifies the traditional masculine work
role model of male achievement, control, and power. Expressions
of this are an orientation toward competition and performance
5and the desire for recognition of one's performance. A highly
masculine social order is one in which males dominate a
significant portion of the power structure, with females being
controlled by male domination. A low masculinity ranking
indicates the country has a low level of differentiation and
discrimination between genders. Women are treated equally
to men in all aspects.
More individualist cultures show a lower probability of total loss
accidents; collectivist cultures exhibit a greater chance of accidents.
A high the level of uncertainty avoidance in a national culture was
also found to be associated with a greater chance of accidents (19).
As aircraft have become increasingly more reliable human performance
has played a proportionately increasing role in the causation of
accidents. This has resulted in a proliferation of human error frameworks
and accident investigation schemes (e.g. 1, 8, 23). However, there has
been no empirical research describing the probabilistic relationship
between national cultures and the underlying patterns of causal factors
in accidents and in particular comparing the contributory factors of
accidents between Eastern and Western cultures. Such an analysis may
provide additional explanatory power in to elucidate why national
differences in accident rates occur.
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (23) is based
on Reason’s (16) model of human error. In this model active failures
associated with the performance of front-line operators in complex
systems, and latent failures which lie dormant within the system, combine
with other local factors to breach a system’s defenses. Active failures
of operators have a direct impact on safety. However, latent failures
6are spawned in the upper levels of the organization and are related to
management and regulatory structures. The system was originally designed
and developed as a generic human error framework for investigating and
analyzing human error accidents in US military aviation operations (20).
The same authors later demonstrated its applicability to the analysis
of accidents in US commercial aviation (21, 22) and US general aviation
(17, 18). Li and Harris (13) demonstrated that the HFACS had a high
degree of inter-rater reliability and was applicable for the analysis
of accidents in a different cultural context.
HFACS addresses human errors at four levels (see figure 1). Level
1 (unsafe acts of operators - active failures) is the level at which
the majority of accident investigations are focused. Failures at this
level can be classified into two categories; errors and violations.
Level 2 (preconditions for unsafe acts - latent/active failures)
addresses the latent failures within the causal sequence of events as
well as the more obvious active failures. It also describes the
substandard conditions of operators and the substandard practices that
they perform. Level 3 (unsafe supervision - latent failures) traces
the causal chain of events producing unsafe acts to the level of the
front-line supervisors. Level 4 (organizational influences - latent
failures) describes the contributions of the most elusive latent failures,
the fallible decisions of upper levels of management which directly
affect supervisory practices, as well as the conditions and actions of
front-line operators. Each higher level affects the next downward level
in HFACS framework.
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To summarize, there is an ongoing need to understand the influence
of culture on aviation safety. Detailed examination of the relative
incidence of the underlying human factors components in the causation
of accidents using HFACS will provide greater insight in this respect,
supplementing and adding explanatory power to the observation that
accident rates differ between different countries and cultures. This
research examines the relative frequency of contributory factors using
the HFACS framework from aircraft accidents in Taiwan (Republic of
China), India and the USA, and relates these differences to aspects of
national culture as described using the typology proposed by Hofstede
(5, 6, 7).
METHOD
Data
The data analyzed in the present study are taken from three researches
classifying aviation mishaps using the HFACS framework. These are from
Taiwan, India and the USA. There were 523 accidents with 1,762 instances
of human error categorized using the HFACS framework from data elicited
from the Taiwan Air Force between 1978 and 2002 (13); 48 accidents with
153 categorized instances of human errors between 1990 and 1999 in the
8Indian data (2); and 119 accidents with 319 of categorized instanced
of human error in US data recorded between 1990 and 1996 (21).
Classification framework
This study based on the HFACS framework as described in Wiegmann
& Shappell (23). The first level of HFACS categorizes events under the
general heading of ‘unsafe acts of operators’ that can lead to an accident
including and comprises of four sub-categories of 'decision errors';
'skill-based errors'; 'perceptual errors' and 'violations' . The second
level of HFACS concerns 'preconditions for unsafe acts' which has a
further seven sub-categories of 'adverse mental states'; 'adverse
physiological states'; 'physical/mental limitations'; 'crew resource
management'; 'personal readiness'; 'physical environment', and
'technological environment'. The third level of HFACS is ‘unsafe
supervision’ including 'inadequate supervision'; 'planned inappropriate
operation'; 'failure to correct known problem', and 'supervisory
violation'. The fourth and highest level of HFACS is ‘organizational
influences’ and comprises of the sub-categories of 'resource
management'; 'organizational climate' and 'organizational process'.
Reliability of HFACS Framework
To avoid over-representation from any single accident, each HFACS
category was counted a maximum of only once per accident. These counts
acted simply as an indicator of presence or absence of each of the 18
categories in any given accident. Inter-rater reliabilities of the data
from Taiwan, calculated as a simple percentage rate of agreement,
9obtained reliability figures for the 18 categories of HFACS of between
72.3% and 96.4% (13). The average of the inter-rater reliabilities of
the data gathered from Indian accidents, calculated by percentage of
agreement, was 87% (2); the US data showed an average inter-rater
reliability of 76% (21).
RESULTS
According to Hofstede’s categorization of national culture (5, 6,
7), Taiwan (Chinese), India and the US occupy considerably different
positions on these four dimensions. This is described diagrammatically
figure 2. Using Hofstede’s categorization system and results from
cross-cultural research, the world average score for power distance (PDI)
is 55; for individualism (IDV) it is 43; for masculinity (MAS) 50 and
for uncertainty avoidance (UAI) it is 64. Therefore, Taiwan can be
characterized as a culture which has a high power distance (PDI = 58);
is collectivist in nature (IDV =17); is feminine (MAS= 45); and exhibits
high uncertainty avoidance (UAI = 69). Indian has a high power distance
culture (PDI = 77); is an individualist culture (IDV = 48); is masculine
(MAS = 56); and exhibits weak uncertainty avoidance (UAI = 40). The
USA is a culture with low power distance (PDI = 40); high individuality
(IDV = 91); is masculine (MAS = 62); and shows weak uncertainty avoidance
(UAI = 46). It is hypothesized that different cultures will show different
patterns in the underlying causal factors in aircraft accidents.
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The presence or absence of each HFACS category at each level as a
contributory factor in an accident was cross-tabulated against country
of occurrence (see table 1). These data were then subject to chi-square
(2) analyses to measure the statistical strength of association between
HFACS category and country. As there is no identifiable dependent or
independent variable in a 2 test of association these analyses were
supplemented with further analyses using Goodman and Kruskall’s tau (τ) 
which was used to calculate the proportional reduction in error (PRE).
The HFACS categories were designated as being dependent upon the country
of accident (the independent variable for these purposes). The value
for tau (τ) indicates the strength of the directional relationship, with 
country of origin being deemed to influence differences in the pattern
of frequency of occurrence in the HFACS categories. Thus, these analyses
go beyond what may be deemed a simple statistical test of co-variance.
Ten HFACS categories exhibited significant differences in reported
frequency of aviation accidents between different countries (p<0.05).
These were, ‘organizational process’, ‘organizational climate’ and
‘resource management’ (level 4); ‘inadequate supervision’ (level 3);
‘personal readiness’, ‘physical/mental limitations’, ‘adverse
physiological states’ and ‘adverse mental states’ (level 2);
‘skilled-based errors’ and ‘decision errors’ (level 1). Furthermore
‘planned inadequate operations’ (level 3); ‘crew resource management’
(level 2) and ‘perceptual errors’ (level 1) were all categories verging
on statistical significance (p<0.10).
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Level 4 - Organizational Influences
All three categories at level 4 showed significant differences in
frequency of occurrence between the three different regions (see table
1). ‘Resource management’, which includes the selection, staffing and
training of human resources at an organizational level, excessive cost
cutting, providing unsuitable equipment, and a failure to remedy design
flaws, was over-represented in both the Taiwanese and Indian sample,
and was under-represented in US. ‘Organizational processes’ including
excessive time pressures, poor mission scheduling, poor incentivization,
failing to set clearly defined objectives, poor risk management programs,
inadequate management checks for safety, and failing to establish safety
programs, was over-represented in the Indian sample of accidents and
under-represent in US and Taiwan. Issues surrounding the ‘organizational
climate’, including inadequacies in the chain of command, poor delegation
of authority, inappropriate organizational customs and beliefs, and poor
accident investigation, were involved in very few accidents, so the
results should be interpreted with some caution. However, this category
was over-represented in India and under-represent in both Taiwan and
USA (see figure 3).
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Level 3 Unsafe Supervision
There was only one HFACS category which exhibited significant
differences in recorded frequency of being implicated in accidents with
respect to country (see table 1). This was ‘inadequate supervision’
which includes factors such as a failure to provide proper training,
adequate rest periods, a lack of accountability, failure to track
qualifications and performance, using untrained supervisors and loss
of situation awareness at the supervisory level. This category was
over-represented in the Taiwan sample and under-represented in India
and the USA. The association between the category of ‘Planned inadequate
operations’ and country was verging on statistical significance
(p=.061). Issues in this category include topics surrounding poor crew
pairings, a failure to establish if risk outweighed benefit, excessive
task/workload, and a failure to provide adequate time for briefing.
There was some evidence to suggest that this category was
under-represented in frequency of occurrence in accidents in the USA
(see figure 4).
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Level 2 - Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
There were four categories with significant differences in frequency
of occurrence with respect to country at level-2 (see table 1). ’Adverse
mental states’, which includes issues such as over-confidence, stress,
loss of situational awareness, distraction, channelized attention and
task saturation, was over-represented in the Taiwanese sample, and
under-represented in both India and the USA. The category of
‘physical/mental limitations’, which includes visual limitations,
information overload and a lack of experience to deal with a complex
situation, was over-represented in Indian occurrences, and
under-represented in both Taiwan and USA. ‘Personal readiness’ which
encompassed issues associated with inadequate training,
self-medication, poor diet, and overexertion while off duty, was
over-represented in frequency of occurrence in both Taiwanese and Indian
accidents, and under-represented in US accidents. ‘Adverse physiological
states’ was over-represented in both the Indian and US sample and
under-represented in accidents from Taiwan. However, as a result of
low numbers in this category it is suggested that the results in this
category may be somewhat unreliable. There was a result verging on
statistical significance for the HFACS category of ‘Crew resource
management’ (p=.058), which includes a lack of teamwork, poor
communication, failures of leadership and inadequate briefing. There
was some suggestion that instances of poor CRM were under represented
in the Indian sample, although as a result of quite low numbers, this
result must also be interpreted with some caution (see figure 5).
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Level 1 - Unsafe Acts of Operators
There were two HFACS categories which showed differences in their
frequency of occurrence between regions at level-1 (table 1).
‘Skill-based errors’ which includes actions such as inappropriate stick
and rudder coordination, excessive use of flight controls, glide path
not maintained, and adopting an improper airspeed or altitude, was
over-represent in both Indian and US accidents but under-represented
in the sample from Taiwan. ‘Decision errors’, which includes issues such
as selecting inappropriate strategies to perform a mission, improper
in-flight planning, making an inappropriate decision to abort a take-off
or landing or using improper remedial actions in an emergency, was
over-represented in the Taiwanese sample of accidents and
under-represented in both the Indian and US sample (see figure 6).
---------------------------------------------
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DISCUSSION
The aviation industry strives to provide the safest possible
transportation regardless of the nationality of the operating personnel
or the carrier. Safety is emphasized through the selection process,
training, aircraft design, and operating procedures and guidelines.
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This research, using the HFACS framework (23) suggests that there are
statistically significant differences in the relative frequencies of
the underlying human factors causes in aviation mishap between Taiwan,
India and the USA. However, such a simple analysis alone showing
differences between countries has little explanatory power. It is
essential to identify the potential causal roots for these differences
in relative frequency of the underlying factors in these aviation
mishaps.
When Western (North American/Western European) engineers and human
factor specialists develop equipment, training and procedures, they
incorporate their own vision of the world which is heavily influenced
by the cultural norms of their country. They implicitly assume that
all users around the world will share their reasoning and values. Klein
(11) observed that people from different nations differ in their
cognition in ways that result in dissimilar perceptions, judgments and
decision-making. National culture provides a fundamental basis for a
group member's behavior, social roles and cognitive processes. It also
provides underlying rules about safety, effective communication, and
provides the basis for verbal and nonverbal interactions. For example,
a frequently used example is that Western co-pilots, from a low power
distance culture are more likely to question the actions of their Captains.
However, co-pilots from Eastern, high power distance countries dare
not to speak out when their opinions may contradict their Captain.
Taiwan and India, countries which both have a high power distance
culture have a higher frequency of events in the ‘organizational
influences’ categories underlying accidents, compared with the USA (see
table 1 and figure 3). According to Hofstede’s (6) classification of
16
national culture, the working environments of Taiwan and India prefer
tall organizational pyramids with centralized decision structures and
have a large proportion of supervisory personnel. In these cultures
subordinates expect to be told what to do. However, members of these
cultures frequently experience role ambiguity and overload. In general,
group decisions are preferred but information is constrained and
controlled by the hierarchy and there is resistance to change. On the
other hand, the working environment of USA exhibits low power-distance
and is a culture high on individualism. Flat organizational structures
are preferred with a relatively small proportion of supervisory personnel.
Subordinates expect to be consulted. Self-orientation and identity
is based on the individual and individual decisions are regarded as being
superior (5).
These national cultural differences may explain the findings
reported in table 1 (and figures 3 and 4). The USA has a much better
record at the level-4 ‘organizational influences’ and level-3 ‘unsafe
supervision’ aspects of the HFACS framework than the other two countries.
In many of the constituent categories at both these HFACS levels, the
USA is underrepresented in the relative frequency of occurrence factors
underlying aviation accidents compared to Taiwan and India. For example,
the category of ‘Resource management’ at level-4 of the HFACS, embraces
issues surrounding the staffing and training of human resources at an
organizational level; providing suitable logistics, and remedying known
design deficiencies in the system. The US culture, with low power
distance and high individualism promotes greater efficacy in addressing
these issues through open discussion by all personnel and allows greater
autonomy of action, and hence as a result may be superior at preventing
accidents than the Taiwanese or Indian cultures, which are less reactive
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as a result of their preferred organizational structures and discourage
autonomy of action (especially at lower managerial levels). These
cultures are also resistant to change.
Uncertainty avoidance reflects how the members of a society perceive
a threat in uncertain situations, and the extent to which they
subsequently try to avoid these situations by means of regulations and/or
bureaucratic sanctions. Taiwan is a strong uncertainty avoidance
culture, with a great deal of hierarchical control, a highly formalized
concept of management and a great deal of top management involvement
in operations. The power of superiors depends upon the control of
uncertainties. On the other hand, the USA and India are both weak
uncertainty avoidance cultures, with a high tolerance for ambiguity in
structures and procedures. In these cultures precision and punctuality
have to be learned and managed and innovations are welcomed (5). It
has to be noted that the cultural dimension of weak uncertainty avoidance
is coupled with high individualism in the USA (to re-iterate, both India
and Taiwan are collectivist cultures). From the results in table 1 it
can be seen that the USA has a relatively poor record at level-2 in the
HFACS, 'preconditions for unsafe acts' (it is over-represented in the
frequency of occurrence ‘crew resource management’ as a causal factor).
Accidents in the US sample are also over-represented at level-1 ‘unsafe
acts of operators’ (with over-representation in the ‘skilled-based
errors’ category). It may be suggested that the explanation for these
observations is that the USA has a culture which prefers individual
decision making and responsibility for the self. In Hofstede’s terms
it is an ego-oriented society. US society itself is quite loosely
structured with a high tolerance for ambiguity and procedures. While
low power-distance and weak uncertainty avoidance may be seen as being
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positive factors in promoting good CRM (both characteristics of the USA)
it can be suggested that high individualism may be a factor that mitigates
against these other potentially positive CRM influences to an extent,
hence the over-representation of CRM-related factors in the US sample.
Taiwan is also over-represented in instances of poor CRM as an
accident-related factor. In this case, however, it might be postulated
that the lack of teamwork is due to a lack of assertiveness as a result
of the high power-distance and collectivist nature of Taiwan’s culture.
The proportionate over-representation of skill-based errors in the US
sample could reflect the masculine nature of US society, where weakness
in performance as a result of a lack of skill or ability due to poor
airmanship or over-confidence would not be readily admitted.
This study supports Soeters & Boer’s (19) suggestion that
individualist cultures have a lower rate of total loss accidents.
However, it also adds to explanatory power to their findings by suggesting
why this may be the case. The example of this type of culture included
in this study (the USA) shows a lower frequency of accident causal factors
at the higher levels of management, as defined by the HFACS analysis
framework. It is the nature of the proactive management style with few
cultural communication barriers between levels in the managerial
hierarchy promoted by this type of culture that is the key to aviation
safety (levels 3 and 4 in HFACS).
On the other hand, Soeters & Boer (19) observed that more
collectivist cultures, such as Taiwan and India had a greater probability
of accidents. Also, they proposed that the greater the degree of
uncertainty avoidance within a national culture, the greater the chance
there was of accidents. While this may be true, there are other aspects
of the Taiwanese culture (e.g. its higher femininity) that may actually
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promote safer behaviors than those found in individualist cultures.
This is particularly true at the lower levels (levels 1 in HFACS).
CONCLUSIONS
The findings clearly show different patterns in the human factors
causes underlying aviation accidents in three different countries. The
underlying cultural causes of these differences are also postulated.
It should be noted, however, that the USA, India and Taiwan are only
exemplars of the cultures that they represent. It is difficult to
generalize the findings reported in these papers beyond these countries.
Generally the US culture seems to be superior for promoting aviation
safety compared to the Taiwanese and Indian cultures. However factors
such as the design of the aircraft, the management procedures and the
nature of safety regulation all have a strong Western Influence. All
of these factors are culturally congruent with the USA, so it is perhaps
not too surprising that this country comes out best when using the HFACS
to analyze the underlying causes of accidents. It could even be argued
that the accident analysis system itself has an implicit cultural bias
within it. Global aviation is strongly influenced by the USA and Western
Europe, however, the challenge for safety is not to ignore these
cross-cultural issues influencing safety but to manage the potential
risks they may present.
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TABLE I.
HFACS Categories
Taiwan India USA
Chi-square ( χ2)and Goodman
& Kruskal Tau ( τ)Yes No Yes No Yes No
Organizational
process
76
80
447
443
20
7
28
41
10
18
109
100
χ2= 30.253, df= 2, p=.000;
τ=.044, p=.000
Organizational
climate
4
7
519
516
5
0.6
43
47
0
2
119
117
χ2= 33.716, df= 2, p=.000;
τ=.049, p=.000
Resource management 184
156
339
366
19
14
29
34
3
36
116
83
χ2= 51.711, df= 2, p=.000;
τ=.075, p=.000
Supervisory violation 8
9
515
514
2
0.8
46
47
2
2
117
117
χ2= 1.792, df= 2, p=.408
Failed correct a known
problem
12
12
511
511
2
1
46
47
2
3
117
116
χ2= 0.939, df= 2, p=.625
Planned inadequate
operations
24
22
499
501
4
2
44
46
1
5
118
114
χ2= 5.569, df= 2, p=.061
Inadequate
supervision
177
144
346
379
7
13
41
35
6
33
113
86
χ2= 44.638, df= 2, p=.000;
τ=.065, p=.000
Technology
environment
44
na
479
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
Physical environment 74
na
449
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
Personal readiness 29
25
494
498
4
2
44
46
0
6
119
113
χ2= 7.973, df= 2, p=.018;
τ=.012, p=.019
Crew resource
management
146
142
377
381
6
13
42
35
35
32
84
87
χ2= 5.677, df= 2, p=.058
Physical/mental
limitation
73
77
450
446
15
7
33
41
13
17
106
102
χ2= 12.108, df= 2, p=.002;
τ=.018, p=.002
Adverse physiological
states
2
5
521
518
2
0.4
46
48
2
1
117
118
χ2= 8.401, df= 2, p=.015;
τ=.012, p=.015
Adverse mental states 184
156
339
367
6
14
42
34
16
36
103
83
χ2= 29.291, df= 2, p=.000;
τ=.042, p=.000
Violations 160
158
363
365
16
14
32
34
32
36
87
83
χ2= 0.880, df= 2, p=.644
Perceptual errors 116
106
407
417
7
10
41
38
17
24
102
95
χ2= 4.774, df= 2, p=.091
Skilled-based errors 226
245
297
278
25
22
23
26
72
56
47
63
χ2= 12.218, df= 2, p=.002;
τ=.018, p=.002
Decision errors 223
202
300
321
10
19
38
29
34
46
85
73
χ2= 15.025, df= 2, p=.000;
τ=.022, p=.001
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TABLE I. THE FREQUENCY OF HFACS CATEGORIES BETWEEN ROC (TAIWAN),
INDIAN, AND USA.
Note: 1. Numbers show as a Roman font at the top of each
cell is the observed value; the numbers shown
in an Italic font at the bottom of each cell is
the expected value.
2. ‘na’ indicates no information was available for
the categories of ‘technology environment’ and
‘physical environment’.
3. Bold font indicates under-representative of the
frequencies.
4. Big size font indicates over-representative
of the frequencies.
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FIGURE I.
FIGURE 1 THE HFACS FRAMEWORK, EACH UPPER LEVEL WOULD AFFECT DOWNWARD
LEVEL PROPOSED BY WIEGMANN & SHAPPELL (2003)
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FIGURE II.
FIGURE II. INDEX OF POWER DISTANCE, UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE,
INDIVIDUALISM, AND MASCULINE BETWEEN TAIWAN, INDIA,
AND USA.
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FIGURE III.
FIGURE III. THE PERCENTAGES OF ‘ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES’ OF HFACS
FRAMEWORK BETWEEN TAIWAN, INDIA, AND USA.
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FIGURE IV.
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FIGURE IV. THE PERCENTAGES OF ‘UNSAFE SUPERVISION’ OF HFACS FRAMEWORK
BETWEEN TAIWAN, INDIA, AND USA.
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FIGURE V.
FIGURE V. THE PERCENTAGES OF ‘PRECONDITION FOR UNSAFE ACTS’ OF HFACS
FRAMEWORK BETWEEN TAIWAN, INDIA, AND USA.
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FIGURE VI.
FIGURE VI. THE PERCENTAGES OF ‘UNSAFE ACTS OF OPERATORS’ OF HFACS
FRAMEWORK BETWEEN TAIWAN, INDIA, AND USA.
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